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The Set-Theoretical Nature of Badiou's 
Ontology and Lautman's Dialectic of 
Problematic Ideas 
Sean Bowden 
In the notes to Being and Event, Badiou declares: '[Albert] 
Lautman's writings are nothing less than admirable and what 
I owe to them, even in the very foundational intuitions for this 
book, is immeasurable' (BE 482). Nowhere in his published work, 
however, does Badiou explain in detail what he believes he owes 
to the philosophy of Lautman. In an interview with Tzuchien Tho, 
Badiou remarks that even though Lautman's primary and second-
ary theses for his doctorat d'etat were published in l 9 3 8, it was 
only well after the 1977 publication of Lautman's collected works 
that he became familiar with them (CM 82). 1 This would certainly 
explain the lack of explicit engagement with Lautman's writings 
prior to the publication of Being and Event. But even after 1988, 
Badiou primarily invokes the figure of Lautman for illustrative 
purposes, or to suggest a very general affinity. Thus, in Logics of 
Worlds, Badiou inscribes himself, but without indicating what such 
an inscription amounts to, in the French tradition of 'mathematis-
ing idealism' which includes Brunschvicg, Cavailles, Lautman, 
Desanti, Althusser and Lacan (LW 7). In Metapolitics, Badiou 
eulogises Lautman, both a philosopher of mathematics and active 
member of the French Resistance who was captured and shot by 
the Nazis in 1944, as one of the 'exemplary resistant figures of 
French philosophy' (M 4-5 ). Finally, in the first Manifesto for 
Philosophy, Badiou cites Lautman as an ally insofar as he, like 
Badiou, is an openly Platonic philosopher standing in opposition 
to the more general twentieth-century trend of Nietzschean anti-
Platonism (MP 100-1). In each of these instances, it is clear that 
Badiou invokes the name of Lautman for purposes other than 
concrete conceptual or argumentative support. 
Three exceptions to this tendency, however, can be found 
in Briefings on Existence: a note to the essay 'Philosophy and 
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Mathematics', originally published in Conditions, and the short 
interview with Tzuchien Tho mentioned above published along-
side the English translation of The Concept of Model. In these three 
texts, Badiou indicates a more substantial philosophical affiliation 
with, and perhaps a philosophical debt to, Lautman. 
In Brie-fings on Existence, Lautman's work is cited in support 
of Badiou's thesis, defended from the time of Being and Event 
onwards, that 'mathematics thinks being qua being' or that 'set 
theory is ontology'. He writes: 'As Albert Lautman's works in 
particular demonstrated, as far back as the r 9 3 os, every signifi-
cant and innovative fragment of real mathematics can and ought 
to evoke, as a condition of existence, its ontological identification' 
(TO 60 - translation modified).2 But how exactly does Badiou 
understand this apparently Lautmanian idea, which he believes 
himself to share, that mathematics evokes - and as a 'condition of 
existence' no less - its ontological identification? 
We ought firstly to recall that, for Badiou, the proposition 'set 
theory is ontology' is a philosophical and not a mathematical 
proposition (TO 59 ). In Manifesto for Philosophy, Badiou argues 
that this particular proposition is grounded in his own philosophy 
insofar as this latter has successfully been able to 'compossibilise' 
a number of contemporary, extra-philosophical 'conditions' or 
'generic truth procedures'. Because the development of set theory 
from Cantor to Paul Cohen is one such truth procedure, within the 
conditioned philosophical space that Badiou constructs, the philo-
sophical thinking of being qua being can be effectively handed 
over to set theory (MP 33-9, 79-81). Indeed, this metaontological 
justification of the 'set theory is ontology' thesis is the one nor-
mally discussed in the secondary literature. 3 
In Briefings on Existence, however, Badiou adds a specifically 
Lautmanian element to his account of the justification of the 
philosophical proposition that set theory is ontology. He writes 
that while it is indeed a matter of philosophy 'identifying what 
its own conditions are', it is also necessary for 'real mathematics 
to be crossed reflexively' (TO, 5 9). In other words, the grounding 
of the proposition that mathematics thinks being qua being is not 
simply a matter of philosophy welcoming within its 'space of com-
possibility' a novel, set-theoretical translation of well-established 
philosophical and ontological concepts. It is also a matter of phi-
losophy fully entering into and traversing mathematical discourse 
(but without itself becoming mathematical discourse) in order 
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to discover how mathematics thinks being qua being in its own 
unique terms. 
Badiou makes a similar point in a note to 'Philosophy and 
Mathematics' - the second text mentioned above. Here, Badiou 
makes it clear that his and Lautman's (as well as Cavailles' and 
Desanti's) philosophical relation to mathematics is a matter of 
treating mathematics 'as a singular site of thinking, whose events 
and procedures must be retraced from within the philosophical 
act' (TW 244). And indeed, this sounds very close to the way 
Lautman expresses his own position on the issue of mathematical 
philosophy: 
Mathematical philosophy . . . consists not so much in retrieving a 
logical problem of classical metaphysics within a mathematical theory, 
than in grasping the structure of this theory globally in order to iden-
tify the logical problem that happens to be both defined and resolved 
by the very existence of this theory. 4 
Finally, in the interview with Tho, Badiou explicitly aligns himself 
with Lautman's unique brand of 'dialectical Platonism' (CM 92-3 ).5 
Badiou's comments here, coupled with the remarks just examined, 
throw a little more light on his belief that he shares with Lautman 
the idea that mathematics elicits, as a condition of existence, its 
ontological identification, and hence also that he owes to Lautman's 
writings some of the fundamental intuitions for his philosophical 
undertaking in Being and Event. In the interview with Tho, Badiou 
alludes to two aspects of Lautman's work which will be examined 
further below. The first aspect is that Lautman understands there to 
be a 'dialectic of Ideas' which drives the historical development of 
mathematics (as its 'condition of existence'), giving to mathematics 
its philosophical value and, as Badiou would say, its 'ontological 
identification'. The second aspect of Lautman's work to which 
Badiou alludes is that there is a dialectal interpenetration of, on the 
one hand, the abstract Ideas governing the development of math-
ematics and, on the other hand, the concrete theories in which such 
development is successively embodied. Indeed, as Badiou appears 
to read Lautman, it is because certain abstract 'ontological' Ideas 
are both transcendent and immanent with respect to concrete math-
ematical theory that philosophy must fully enter into and traverse 
mathematical discourse in order to discover how mathematics 
evokes, in its own terms, its ontological character. 
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In line with textual evidence such as this, this chapter proposes 
to explore in greater depth the precise nature of the debt that 
Badiou owes to Lautman in Being and Event. The chapter's thesis 
is that Badiou's assertion that set theory is ontology is grounded 
upon what Lautman calls a 'dialectic of problematic Ideas'. More 
specifically, it will be argued here that the proposition that set 
theory is ontology is grounded insofar as set theory simultaneously 
defines and resolves, in its own terms, a connected series of philo-
sophical - or, more precisely, ontological - problems. As will be 
seen, following Lautman's work, these problems can be expressed 
in the form of yet-to-be-determined relationships between a 
number of opposed notions belonging to the history of philoso-
phy and ontology: the one and the multiple, Nature as poem and 
Nature as Idea, the finite and the infinite, and the continuous and 
the discrete. In what follows, I shall demonstrate exactly how the 
Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) axioms which found Badiou's set-theory 
ontology together resolve this series of dialectical couples. In con-
cluding, I will also raise a problem which ensues from Badiou's 
Lautmanian heritage. But let us first of all examine the major lines 
of Albert Lautman's only recently translated work. 
Albert Lautman and the Dialectic of Problematic Ideas 
Lautman distinguished several layers of mathematical reality. 
Apart from mathematical facts, objects and theories, Lautman 
also argued for the existence of a 'dialectic of Ideas' which governs 
the development of mathematical theories and provides them 
with their unity, meaning and philosophical value. 6 This dialectic 
is constituted by pairs of opposites (same and other, whole and 
part, continuous and discrete, essence and existence, etc.), and 
the Ideas of this dialectic present themselves as the problem of 
establishing relationships between these opposed notions. 7 As 
prior 'questions' or 'logical concerns' relative to mathematical 
discourse, these problematic Ideas are transcendent with respect 
to mathematics and can be posed outside of mathematics. Indeed, 
many of the pairs of opposites analysed by Lautman can be found 
in the history of philosophy. However, since the Ideas, in order to 
be thought concretely, require an appropriate 'matter' in which 
they can be thought, any effort to respond to the problems that 
they pose is to effectively constitute mathematical theory. In this 
sense, therefore, the dialectic must equally be said to be immanent 
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to mathematics. 8 As Lautman puts it, an 'intimate link thus exists 
between the transcendence of Ideas and the immanence of the 
logical structure of the solution to a dialectical problem within 
mathematics' .9 
In a letter to the mathematician Maurice Frechet, Lautman pro-
vides the following example in order to clarify his thought on this 
point: 
One can envisage abstractly the Idea of knowing whether rela-
tions between abstract notions exist, for example the container and 
the content, but it happens that any effort whatsoever to outline a 
response to this problem is ipso facto the fashioning of mathemati-
cal theories. The question of knowing whether forms of solidarity 
between space and matter exist is in itself a philosophical problem, 
which is at the centre of Cartesian metaphysics. But any effort to 
resolve this problem leads the mind necessarily to construct an analytic 
mechanics in which a connection between the geometric and dynamic 
can in fact be asserted. 10 
In order to avoid the charge of naive idealism, Lautman is careful 
to qualify the transcendence of Ideas as simply the 'possibility' 
of experiencing concern for a mode of connection between two 
ideas. 11 The anteriority of Ideas is here rational or logical as 
opposed to psychological or historical. 12 And this is precisely why 
Lautman argues that mathematics not only incarnates traditional 
metaphysical problems, it can also give birth to problems that 
could not have been previously posed. As we mentioned above, 
Lautman's particular approach to the philosophy of mathematics 
does not so much consist in finding a well-established metaphysi-
cal problem within a mathematical theory. It is rather a matter of 
grasping the overall structure of a given theory in order to extract 
the problem that is at once defined and resolved in it. 13 
Nevertheless, as Lautman goes on to argue, just as, in the very 
meaning of these terms, 'intention' precedes 'design' and the 'ques-
tion' the 'response', the existence of established mathematical rela-
tions necessarily refers to the prior, positive Idea of the search for 
such relations. 14 Or to put it another way, because the 'sufficient 
reason' for the diversity and development of mathematical theo-
ries, along with their progressive integrations and interferences, 
cannot be found within mathematics itself, 15 one is obliged to 
affirm the prior existence of something like the dialectic of Ideas. 
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In short, to conceive of the historical development of diverse math-
ematical theories and their 'mixes' as responses or solutions to 
problematic Ideas is to give unity and meaning to these theories. 16 
Now, it is of course clear that Badiou's concern is not that of the 
unity and meaning of mathematics in Lautman's sense. However, 
it will be the contention of this chapter that there is something like 
a dialectic of Ideas that traverses Being and Event, and that it is 
precisely this dialectic that allows Badiou to make the claim that 
'ontology is set theory'. Or to put it another way, it is only because 
Badiou shows set theory to be capable of providing a systematic 
response to a series of dialectically opposed notions which can be 
found in the history of ontology (and philosophy more generally) 
that set theory can be said to be ontology. These dialectical couples 
include: the one and the multiple, Nature as poem and Nature as 
Idea, the finite and the infinite, and the continuous and the dis-
crete. This chapter shall demonstrate how the Zermelo-Fraenkel 
axiom system which 'founds' Badiou's set-theory ontology m 
Being and Event resolves these dialectically opposed notions. 
The One and the Multiple 
Being and Event begins by outlining and then advancing a solution 
to the problem of 'the one and the multiple'. This is a problem, 
Badiou argues, with which any possible ontology will have to 
deal. It can be unpacked in the following way. Firstly, any pre-
sented concrete thing must be one. A thing is, after all, this thing. 
Secondly, however, presentation itself is multiple, which is to say 
that what can be presented is presentable in multiple and variable 
ways. When it is asked whether being is one or multiple, therefore, 
one comes to an impasse. For, on the one hand, if being is one, 
then the multiple cannot be. On the other hand, if presentation 
is multiple and there cannot be an access to being outside of all 
presentation, then the multiple must be. But if the multiple is, then 
being is not equivalent to the one. And yet there is a presentation 
of this multiple only if what is presented is one. Badiou then says 
that this deadlock can only be broken by declaring that the one, 
strictly speaking, is not: oneness is rather only a 'result', a multi-
plicity which has been 'counted for one'. Badiou calls such a mul-
tiplicity a 'situation', and every situation must have a 'structure' 
which is the operator of its count-as-one (BE 23-4). 
For Badiou, then, every identifiable being is in situation. In other 
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words, every being is a consistent multiplicity, counted-for-one. 
What is not in situation, what is not counted-for-one as this or 
that thing, could only be qualified as 'no-thing'. There is, then, 
no-thing apart from situations, that is apart from consistent one-
multiples, and these situations must all be posterior or subsequent 
to a structuring or count-as-one operation. However, at the same 
time, to say as I did above that the one is a result must mean that 
anterior to any possible count-as-one or consistent multiple there 
must be, and could only be, inconsistent multiplicity. In the final 
analysis, therefore, if the one is only ever a result, then inconsistent 
multiplicity- this no-thing which is outside of any situation - must 
ultimately be presupposed as the one-less 'stuff' or pure unquali-
fied being of any possible being: that which is included in what any 
presentation presents (BE 24-5 ). 
But now, what can be said about this pure, unqualified being? 
More specifically, how can it be presented to thought, not as some 
specific 'thing' or consistent one-multiple, but qua being? In other 
words, what could ontology be - the science of being qua being? 
Ontology, for Badiou, must be a situation, but it clearly cannot 
present inconsistent multiplicity as a one-multiple. Ontology must 
rather be a situation capable of presenting inconsistent multiplicity 
as that from which every presented or in-situation 'thing' is com-
posed, but without thereby giving inconsistent multiplicity any 
other predicate other than its multiplicity. In other words, ontol-
ogy will be the situation which 'presents presentation' in general 
(BE 27-8). And the only way it can do this, following Badiou, is by 
somehow showing in its very structure that this no-thing or incon-
sistent multiplicity exists, and that everything in the ontological 
situation is composed out of it, but without thereby counting this 
inconsistent multiplicity for one. And for Badiou, it is the axioms 
of set theory which fulfil this prior structural necessity, since they 
only give an implicit definition of what it operates on: the pure 
multiple (BE 28-30, 52-9). In short, then, for Badiou, insofar as 
set theory alone can respond to the above analysed ontological 
problematic, it is the only possible ontology. 
So how exactly do the ZF axioms fulfil ontology's a priori 
requirements, the requirements which, it is evident, correspond 
to nothing internal to set theory? First of all, it reduces the one to 
the status of a relationship, that of simple belonging, written E. 
In other words, everything will be presented, not according to the 
one of a concept, but only according to its relation of belonging 
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or counting-for-one: 'something = a' will thus only be presented 
according to a multiple ~' written a E ~ or 'a is an element of 
W. Secondly, the theory has only one type of variable and hence 
does not distinguish between 'objects' and 'groups of objects', or 
between 'elements' and 'sets'. In other words, to be an element 
is not an intrinsic quality in ZF. It is a simple relation: to-be-an-
element-of. Thus, by the uniformity of its variables, the theory 
can indicate without definition that it does not speak of the one, 
and that all that it presents in the implicitness of its rules are mul-
tiples of multiples: multiples belonging to or presented by other 
multiples. Indeed, and thirdly, via the 'axiom of separation', the 
system affirms that a property or formula of language does not 
directly present an existing multiple. Rather, such a presentation 
could only ever be a 'separation' or subset of an already presented 
multiplicity. A property only determines a multiple under the 
supposition that there is already a presented multiple {BE 43-8). 
Everything thus hinges on the determination of the initial pure 
multiple. But as was seen above, as a necessary consequence of the 
decision that the one results - called for by the problematic rela-
tionship between the one and the multiple - there must be, ante-
rior to any count, inconsistent multiplicity, and it is this which is 
ultimately counted. It appears, then, that this inconsistent multiple 
- the void, the unpresentable of presentative consistency - is the 
absolutely initial multiple. 
How, then, can the void have its existence assured, and in such 
a way that ontology can weave all of its compositions from it 
alone? As Badiou says, it is by making this nothing 'be' through 
the assumption of a pure proper name: 0 (BE 66-7). That the void 
is named is not to say, of course, that the void is thereby one. What 
is named is not the one of the void, but rather its uniqueness or 
'unicity'. In what sense is the void unique? Another axiom of ZF 
tells us this. This is the 'axiom of extensionality' which will fix the 
rule of difference or sameness for any two multiples whatsoever, 
that is according to the elements which belong to each. The void 
set, then, having no elements - being the multiple of nothing - can 
have no conceivable differentiating mark according to this axiom. 
But then, if no difference can be attested, this means that there is a 
unicity of the unpresentable within presentation. There cannot be 
'several' voids: the void is unique and this is what is signalled by 
the proper name, 0 (BE 67-9). 
So how does set-theory ontology weave its compositions out of 
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this proper name? What is crucial to this operation is the 'power-
set axiom' or 'axiom of subsets'. This axiom guarantees that if a 
set exists, another set also exists that counts as one all the subsets 
of this first set, thereby regulating or counting as one the internal 
compositions of a given being or situation. It has been seen what 
belonging means: an element (a multiple) belongs to a situation 
(a set) if it is directly presented and counted for one by this situa-
tion. Inclusion, on the other hand, concerns subsets or parts of a 
situation rather than directly presented elements. In other words, 
elements directly presented by a set can be re-presented, that is 
grouped into subsets that are said to be included in the initial set. 
Inclusion is written c: a c ~ or a is a subset (a part) of ~. 17 The 
power-set axiom gathers together or counts as one all such inclu-
sions, all of the sub-compositions of internal multiples. It says that 
if a set a exists, there also exists the set of all its subsets: its power 
set p(a) (BE 81-4). What, then, can be said of the void from the 
point of view of the difference between belonging and inclusion? 
It has already been seen that the void is never presented: it never 
belongs to another multiple. What is more, since the void is the 
multiple of nothing, nothing belongs to the void. However, it can 
be shown both that the void is a subset of any set - it is universally 
included - and that the void possesses a subset, which is the void 
itself (BE 86). Indeed, it is impossible for the empty set not to be 
universally included. For, following the axiom of extensionality, 
since the set 0 has no elements, nothing is marked which could 
deny its inclusion in any multiple (see also NN 64). Furthermore, 
then, since the set 0 is itself an existent-multiple, 0 must be a 
subset of itself (BE 86-7). 
One can now begin to see how the axioms of set theory - which 
are, for Badiou, the 'laws of being' - weave compositions out of 
the void. The argument is as follows: since the void admits at least 
one subset, itself, the power-set axiom can be applied. The set of 
subsets of the void, p(0), is the set to which everything included 
in the void belongs. Thus, since 0 is included in 0, 0 belongs to 
p(0). This new set, p(0), is thus 'our second existent-multiple 
in the "genealogical" framework of the set-theory axiomatic. It 
is written {0} and 0 is its sole element': 0 E {0} (BE 89 ). Now, 
let us consider the set of subsets of {0}, that is p( {0} ). This set 
exists, since {0} exists. What, then, are the parts of {0}? There is 
{0} itself, which is the total part, and there is 0, since the void is 
universally included in any multiple. The multiple p( {0}) is thus a 
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multiple with two elements, 0 and {0}. Woven from the void, this 
is, as Badiou puts it, 'the ontological schema of the Two', which 
can be written {0,{0}} (BE 92, r 3 r-2). It becomes clear that this 
is where the unlimited production of new multiples begins, woven 
from the void in accordance with the laws of being (and particu-
larly the power-set axiom). For, since this set, {0,{0}}, exists, one 
can consider its power set p({0,{0}}), etc .... This process can 
obviously be repeated indefinitely and it is in fact in this way that 
one can generate our counting numbers, our 'natural' or 'ordinal' 
numbers (also called Von Neumann ordinals): 
o=0 
I = {0} = {o} 
2 = {0,{0}} = {o,r} 
3 = {0,{0},{0,{0}}} = {o,r,2} ... 1s 
Nature as Poem and Nature as Idea 
Indeed, it is from this generation of 'natural' numbers, all woven 
from the void in accordance with the axioms of being, that Badiou 
will establish his ontological concept of 'Nature'. Or more pre-
cisely, that Badiou understands Nature in this way is the result of 
the way in which set-theory ontology provides a resolution of the 
tension, highlighted since the work of Heidegger, between Nature 
understood poetically as appearance or the poetic coming-to-
presence of Being (the pre-Platonic poem), and Nature interpreted 
as Idea, subtracted from all appearance (in the manner of Plato) 
(BE 123-9; on Plato see also BE 3 r-7). In other words, within the 
perspective of a set-theoretical ontology, Badiou will be able to find 
another arrangement of these two opposed orientations. In short, 
following Heidegger, he will maintain that Nature is 'the stability 
of maintaining-itself-there' within the opening forth of its imma-
nent coming-to-presence. On the other hand, he will mathematise 
the Platonic subtraction of being from appearance. Or again, he 
will develop a concept of Nature as a network of multiples which 
are interlocking and exhaustive without remainder, but which are 
also woven entirely from what is subtracted from all presence: the 
void. The point is, of course, that without reference to the oppos-
ing conceptions of Nature belonging to Heidegger and Plato, the 
assertion that natural or ordinal numbers formalise the being of 
natural things would appear somewhat arbitrary or as a play on 
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words. Certainly, nothing within set theory itself authorises such 
an ontological appropriation of the generation of ordinals. 
Let us follow Badiou as he formulates his concept of Nature in 
the wake of this dialectical couple. On the one hand, conceding 
the stability of Nature to Heidegger, a multiple a will be said to be 
'natural' (also called normal, ordinal or transitive) if every element 
B of this set is also a subset or part (that is, if BE a then B ca), and 
if every element ~ of a is itself natural in this way (that is, if y E ~ 
then y c ~). This doubling of belonging and inclusion guarantees 
that there is nothing uncounted or unsecured in natural multiples 
which might contradict their internal consistency and concatena-
tion. Just as Nature can never contradict itself, natural multiples 
remain homogeneous in dissemination. Every natural multiple is 
here obviously a 'piece' of another, for, by the definition of inclu-
sion, if~ is included in the natural multiple a, every element y that 
belongs to~ must also belong to a, and so on (BE 123-9). 
On the other hand, mathematising Platonic subtraction, it can 
be said that the name of the void founds the series of natural 
multiples, conceived of in the way that has just been seen, in the 
double sense of formalising its concept and acting as its indivisible 
limit or atom. As examined above, an unlimited series of natural 
multiples can be generated from the void and the laws of ontology. 
For not only does the element {0} have 0 as its unique element, 
since the void is a universal part, this element 0 is also a part. 
Furthermore, since the element 0 does not present any element, 
nothing belongs to it that is not a part. There is thus no obstacle to 
declaring it to be natural. As such, the power set of {0} - p( {0}) or 
the Two: {0,{0}} - is natural, and all of its elements are natural, 
and so on. Ordinal numbers thus both formalise the concept of 
natural multiples within set theory and are themselves existing 
natural multiples. And what is more, the name of the void is the 
ultimate natural element or atom which founds the entire series, 
in the sense in which the void is the 'smallest' natural multiple. In 
other words, if every natural multiple is a 'piece' of every other, 
the void is the only natural multiple to which no further element 
belongs {BE 130-40). 
Needless to say, however, in Badiou's set-theoretical concept of 
Nature, there can be no possible formulation of Nature-in-itself. 
For Nature-in-itself would have to be a multiple which makes a 
one out of all the ordinals. But since this multiple would itself 
have to be an ordinal to make a one out of all the ordinals that 
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belong to it, it would have to belong to itself. However, since no 
set can belong to itself, Nature in itself can have no sayable being 
(BE I40-I). Indeed, that no founded or consistent set can belong 
to itself is a fundamental presupposition of set theory. The ZF 
axiom system can even be said to have arisen in response to the 
paradoxes induced by self-belonging, such as those demonstrated 
by Russell {BE 40-3 ). In fact, the ZF 'axiom of foundation' was 
formulated in order to exclude the introduction of sets which 
belong to themselves. This axiom says that a set is founded if it has 
at least one element whose elements are not themselves elements 
of the initial set, that is, if it contains an element which has no 
members in common with the initial set. It is thus obvious that no 
set founded in this way can belong to itself (BE 18 5-7). 
The Finite and the Infinite 
This last point leads to a further problem, even if Badiou does 
not pose it in quite this way. What is crucial here is that this 
problem corresponds to that of the ontological problem of 'being-
in-totality'. It has been seen that there cannot be a set of all sets 
which would govern the total count. But this does not in any way 
dispense with the task of examining the operation of the count. 
For precisely, when one turns to examine it, one notices something 
strange: because the one is not, because the count-as-one is only an 
operation, something always escapes the count-as-one and threat-
ens thereby to ruin consistency. This 'something' is nothing other 
than the count itself, and this is true of natural as much as non-
natural situations (BE 9 3-4). In other words, because the 'one' is 
only an operational result, if the count-as-one is not itself counted 
for one, it is impossible to verify that 'there is Oneness' is also valid 
for the counting operation. 'The consistency of presentation thus 
requires that all structure be doubled by a metastructure which 
secures the former against any fixation of the void', that is against 
any inconsistency (BE 93-4). This metastructure of a structured set 
- what Badiou also calls the 'state of the situation' (BE 9 5) - is pre-
cisely the power set which counts as one all of the initial set's parts. 
That is to say that it counts all of the possible internal compositions 
of the elements of the initial set up to and including the 'total part': 
the composition of elements that is the initial set. 'The complete-
ness of the initial one-effect is thus definitely, in turn, counted as 
one by the state in the form of its effective whole' (BE 98). 
Badiou and Lautman 5 l 
Be that as it may, one cannot dispense in this way with the 
problem of the completion of the count of one-results without 
also dealing with a second historico-philosophical problem, a 
problem which can be phrased as: what is the relationship between 
being-in-totality and the finite/infinite couple? Or again: in the 
shadow of the problem of being-in-totality, what does it mean to 
say with the moderns that Nature is essentially infinite (BE 14 3)? 
Following Badiou's reconstruction of the history of the relation-
ship between being-in-totality and the finite/infinite couple, one 
observes first of all that Aristotle's ontology was a finite ontology, 
since he refused to accept the existence of anything actually infinite 
or 'non-traversable' in nature. Indeed, for Aristotle, infinity could 
only be 'potential'. Medieval ontology, for its part, kept the finite 
Aristotelian ontology and supplemented it with an infinite being: 
God. Being-in-totality was thus here distributed into finite and 
infinite beings, God representing the 'punctual limit' of what finite 
beings cannot know (BE 142-3). Now, however, with the moderns, 
the concept of infinity shifts from God to Nature. But this does not 
mean that Nature is likened to a de-punctualised God. Indeed, as 
shown in Kant's antinomies, the one of Nature is illusory. Thus, fol-
lowing Badiou, since the one is not, that Nature is infinite must nec-
essarily mean that presentation itself is infinite, and indeed infinitely 
infinite. If the one is not, there cannot be any one-infinite-being but 
only, as will be seen, numerous infinite multiples. The recognition 
of the infinity of Nature, the infinity of being, is the recognition of 
the infinity of situations: the count-as-one, even of a finite natural 
multiple, concerns an infinity of infinite multiples (BE 14 3-6). 
What does it mean exactly when Badiou says that Nature or the 
count-as-one concerns infinite multiples? To say that situations 
are essentially infinite must mean that the finite is itself derived 
from the infinite. For, precisely, would not the succession of finite 
natural multiples or ordinals have need of the infinite in order to 
qualify it as the one-multiple that it is, that is in order to form-one 
out of all of its terms? This is what the 'axiom of infinity' declares: 
there exists an infinite limit ordinal, ro0, and for all a, if a belongs 
to this limit ordinal, and if a is not void, then a is a finite, natural 
successor ordinal (0 of course is the initial existent multiple, not a 
successor). One can thus see that infinity counts-as-one all of the 
successor ordinals insofar as it is the 'support-multiple in which 
all the ordinals passed through mark themselves, step by step' (BE 
l 5 5-6). 
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Strictly speaking, however, infinity is not simply equivalent to 
the limit ordinal ro0, for one can also generate infinite successor 
ordinals for it such that, precisely, ro0 E S(ro0) (also written ro1) (see BE 2 7 5-7).19 So, then, an ordinal is infinite if it is ro0 or if ro0 
belongs to it. An ordinal is finite if it belongs to ro0 (BE r 5 8-9). 
It is thus in this way that Badiou can affirm, with the moderns 
but also within his set-theory ontology, that Nature is infinite. 
Or again, that being qua being is infinite. Or finally, that what 
can be said of being qua being - the presentation of inconsistent 
multiplicity or of what would be presentation in itself - essen-
tially concerns infinite multiples and indeed, since one can always 
generate further infinite successor ordinals, an infinite number of 
infinite multiples (see BE 275-7). Yet this is not the end of the 
problem of the distribution of the finite and the infinite within 
being-in-totality. For it must now be asked: what here becomes of 
the necessary re-securing relationship between presentation and 
re-presentation - between the count and the count of the count 
- with respect to this understanding of the essential infinity of 
natural presentation? For a finite set of n elements, the power set 
is obviously equivalent to 2n, but what could the power set of an 
infinite set possibly amount to? 
The Continuous and the Discrete 
In fact, the more precise question that Badiou asks is the follow-
ing: is the power set p(ro0) - that is to say, the count-as-one of all 
possible subsets of the complete series of finite natural numbers, 
sufficient for a complete numerical description of the geometrical 
continuum - equivalent to ro1, the smallest infinite natural multiple 
which directly succeeds and counts-as-one ro0 ? This is Cantor's 
famous 'continuum hypothesis' (see BE 29 5). The importance of 
this hypothesis is that, if it were true, we would have a 'natural 
measure' for the geometrical or physical continuum. Or in other 
words, we would have a quantitative knowledge of being qua 
being. For, if the continuum could be numerically measured, every 
discrete multiple could be quantitatively secured therein. The 
'great question' of Badiou's set-theory ontology, translating the 
problematic couple continuous/discrete, is thus: is there an essen-
tial 'nurnerosity' of being (BE 26 5)? The answer is: we possess 
a natural measuring scale (the succession of ordinals), but it is 
impossible to determine where, on this scale, the set of parts of ro0 
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is situated (BE 277-8). Or more precisely, following the work of 
Cohen and Easton, it appears that 
it is deductively acceptable to posit that [p( ro0) is equal to] ro347, 
or ro(ro0 )+18 , or whatever other cardinal as immense as you like ... 
Easton's theorem establishes the quasi-total errancy of the excess of 
the state over the situation. It is as though, between the structure in 
which the immediacy of belonging is delivered, and the metastructure 
which counts as one the parts and regulates the inclusions, a chasm 
opens. (BE 280) 
To recap: on the one hand, the One is not and being qua being 
essentially concerns an infinite number of rigorously defined, infi-
nite, natural multiples, all woven from the void (BE 269: 'being is 
universally deployed as nature'). On the other hand, the 'there is 
Oneness' of the presentation of such multiples - the count of the 
count - must be completely secured in order to render these dis-
crete 'one'-beings consistent (BE 93-4). But now this means that, 
if we had a measure for this void-less continuum we would also 
have a quantitative knowledge of being qua being. This measure-
ment cannot, however, be fixed. This 'un-measure', that is to say 
this variant on the enduring metaphysical problem of the relation-
ship between the discreet and the continuous - itself the more 
general expression of the question of the distribution of the finite 
and the infinite within being-in-totality - is what Badiou calls the 
'impasse of ontology' (BE 279).20 To resolve it, Badiou will be led 
to a consideration of what, with Cohen's 'ontological' technique 
of 'forcing', corresponds to the philosophical notions of the event, 
the subject and truth. 
We cannot examine in detail these further developments. Suffice 
it to say that what Badiou calls an 'event' will be an unfounded 
multiple (inscribed in ontology by the supplementary signifier ~) 
which supplements the situation for which it is an event. It will 
be a self-founding 'supernumerary' something - named or posited 
as existent - whose place cannot be recognised in the situation as 
given, even though it can come to belong to or be counted within 
that situation, giving thereby the general 'one-truth' of said situ-
ation. This supplementation by the event will call for a 'subject' 
who asserts and then verifies - by examining one by one the con-
nection of the infinite number of in-situation multiples to the event 
- the existence of the supernumerary event in the situation. This 
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subject 'is' here nothing other than a finite multiple or 'fragment' 
of an infinite procedure of verification, a finite fragment which 
maintains a law-like relation to the aforementioned 'one-truth' 
which can be articulated in ontology (forcing). Finally, the 'truth' 
of the situation will be the 'indiscernible' or 'generic' multiplicity 
which will have resulted from the necessarily infinite procedure 
of verification which groups as 'one' all of the terms of the situa-
tion that are positively connected to the name of the self-founding 
event.21 
Or again, to put it more 'ontologically', Cohen's technique 
shows that sets of conditions of a generic subset Sj2 can be con-
structed which force, in a generic extension, the number of parts 
of ro0 to surpass an absolutely indeterminate cardinal 8 given in 
advance (see BE 420-6). This is the effective 'ontological proof' 
of the 'un-measure' of the continuum. But at the same time, 
as Badiou argues, this proof produces within ontology a 'one' 
account of inconsistent being qua being. How? In short, it con-
structs an infinite generic multiple by collecting, starting from 
the void, series of multiples attached to a supplementary, evental 
signifier Sj2. But because it is not itself 'discerned', this generic mul-
tiple sets no limits to what it can rigorously collect as one and is 
thus, in the final analysis, 
composed of terms which have nothing in common that could be 
remarked, save belonging to this situation; which, strictly speaking, is 
its being, qua being ... It is rightfully declared generic, because, if one 
wishes to qualify it, all one can say is that its elements are ... [This is] 
the truth of the entire situation, insofar as the sense of the indiscern-
ible is that of exhibiting as one-multiple the very being of what belongs 
insofar as it belongs. (BE 3 3 8-9) 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, then, it appears that the ontology outlined in Being 
and Event is grounded insofar as it resolves, in specifically set-
theoretical terms, a series of dialectical couples: the one and the 
multiple, Nature as poem and Nature as Idea, the finite and the 
infinite, and the discrete and the continuous. This way of estab-
lishing set theory's 'ontological identification' constitutes Badiou's 
debt to Lautman and is fully in line with the farmer's scattered 
remarks about the latter examined above. But it also follows from 
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this that while Badiou's ontology fulfils its aim of 'presenting 
presentation' in set-theoretical terms, it only does so in relation to 
another, prior and very different presentation of the ontological 
situation itself: that is, insofar as it must be thought as a response 
to a series of dialectical couples. But then this is also to say that 
being is equivocal in Badiou's system~ Being is said once for the 
ontological situation insofar as it is grounded in a Lautmanian dia-
lectic of problematic Ideas, and it is said once again for what the 
ontological situation, so determined, can say of being in general in 
a set-theoretical vocabulary. 
Of course, Badiou would reply to this that if having an equivo-
cal conception of being is what is required in order to think the 
particular, generic truth-procedures which collectively condition 
his philosophy, then he is happy to bear the criticism. As he writes 
in Deleuze: The Clamor of Being (although in relation to a reading 
of his system that differs from the one presented here, except in 
relation to the charge of equivocity): 
Deleuze always maintained that ... I fall back into transcendence 
and into the equivocity of analogy. But, all in all, if the only way to 
think a political revolution, an amorous encounter, an invention of 
the sciences, or a creative work of art as distinct infinities - having as 
their condition incommensurable events - is by sacrificing immanence 
(which I do not actually believe is the case, but that is not what matters 
here) and the univocity of Being, then I would sacrifice them. (D 91-2) 
But what disadvantages does such a conception in fact present, 
if any? The first disadvantage, of course, is that Badiou does not 
have a single or unified concept of being. It is true that, in the 
history of ontology, being has often been said in different senses: 
in Aristotle, for example, but also in the work of various medieval 
philosophers, for whom God 'is' in a different way from the way 
in which his creatures 'are' (Duns Scotus here being the notable 
exception). Nevertheless, Ockham's Razor could apply here, 
leading one to prefer an ontology in which being is said in a single 
sense of all there is. 
A second disadvantage would be that, because Badiou's ontol-
ogy presupposes a prior dialectic of problematic Ideas but does not 
itself think the nature of this dialectics, it cannot think its relation 
to another philosophical system presenting a different but equally 
systematic solution to the same problems resolved by Badiou's 
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ontology, except as irreducible subjective conflict pure and simple. 
Again, this would not concern Badiou, who has a militant concep-
tion of the subject. But perhaps it would be of concern for those 
seeking a more supple approach to thinking the relations between 
the antagonistic subjectivities - political, scientific and so on -
which can fall under different philosophical world views. 
Taking these two points together, then, one can ask oneself the 
following critical question: can we conceive of a univocal concep-
tion of being which would be grounded solely on a Lautmanian-
style dialectic of problematic Ideas, wherein beings in general 
could be considered to be 'solutions' to this dialectic, and in such 
a way that the various antagonistic subjectivities characterising 
our contemporary world can be thought together without irre-
ducible conflict? I believe that Gilles Deleuze, another follower 
of Lautman, has developed such an ontology, particularly in his 
Difference and Repetition. As Deleuze writes: 
The problem is at once transcendent and immanent in relation to its 
solutions. Transcendent because it consists in a system of ideal liaisons 
or differential relations between genetic elements. Immanent, because 
these liaisons or relations are incarnated in the actual relations which 
do not resemble them and are defined by the field of solution. Nowhere 
better than in the admirable work of Albert Lautman has it been 
shown how problems are first Platonic Ideas or ideal liaisons between 
dialectical notions, relative to 'eventual situations of the existent'; but 
also how they are realized within the real relations constitutive of the 
desired solution with a mathematical, physical or other field. 22 
Indeed, in Difference and Repetition, Deleuze shows how entities 
in diverse domains - physical, biological, psychological, social, 
linguistic, mathematical - can all be considered to emerge as 
solutions to Lautmanian 'problematic Ideas'. Moreover, Deleuze 
shows how the subject who thinks and 'actualises' problematic 
Ideas is itself merely a provisional 'solution' to these latter, which 
means that subjective conflict is really only an illusory 'freezing' of 
the underlying and ever-shifting differential relations constituting 
the dialectic of Ideas. 23 Such a Lautman-inspired ontology, then, 
it would appear, might offer a way around some of the difficulties 
associated with Badiou's fascinating project. Nevertheless, the full 
justification of this claim cannot be dealt with here. 
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